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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
should not be "estopped" from showing that fact, since one
of the essentials of the doctrine of estoppel, namely, injury
to the plaintiff, is not present, because an action against the
corporation, the very thing he looked forward to, in case
of breach, is still available to him.
The objection that in such an action there is no authorized agent upon whom process may be served, is not tenable. It has been decided, that service upon such agent, if
regularly made, is good service against the corporation,
even though it failed to appoint one in accordance with the
act of 1874, before its repeal. 16 The reason being, that it is
to be presumed that the corporation appointed such agent
as one upon whom service is authorized to be made."I There
is no substantial objection to following the same course
under the act of 1911, more properly, 1915.
In short, the theory is, that plaintiff being still in a
position to enforce his rights against the corporation, the
agents and officers should not be estopped from asserting
the fact that he intended a contract with the corporation
and not with them as individuals. The theory fits the cases
of domestic corporations as well as those of foreign corporations without resort to an unwarranted over-extension
of the doctrine of "estoppel".
Jose E. Oller

ADMISSIBILITY OF RECORD OF PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS TO ATTACK CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSThe case of Commonwealth v. Quaranta, 295 Pa. 264, lays
down a proposition regarding the admissibility of records
of prior convictions in order to attack a witness' character
for veracity. The rule is stated by Mr. Justice Kephart to
be, "When a party becomes a witness for himself, he stands
in no better position than any other witness not a party.1
Conduct derogatory to the witness' character for veracity
may be proved by showing that he has been convicted of an
infamous offense. No collateral issue of fact is thus raised,
as the record establishes the fact. But every offense or
16Hagerman v. Slate Co., 97 Pa. 534 (1881).
ITCase supra; Eastman, Private Corporations, Vol. 1 (2d Ed.)
p. 554. Service may be made on any agent within the state, Supra;
see 23-L. R. A. 490.
'Beck v. Hood, 185 Pa. 32 (1898); Commonwealth v. Racco, 225
Pa. 113 (1909).
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crime under the law is not relevant to prove one's character
for veracity, and, as it is not permissable to show a general
bad character because of the abuse that could be made of
it by the prosecution, 2 the only crimes admissible to attack
veracity are such as affect credibility and refer to the conviction of a felony or a misdemeanor in the nature of crimen
falsi.3 In determining what are relevant crimes to affect
credibility, the question is ordinarily for the trial judge,
and where defendant is a witness, the trial judge is vested
especially if defendwith a large discretion as to relevancy,
4
ant is known to be of criminal habit".
Considerable confusion is found among the previous
Pennsylvania decisions but this confusion is not due to
the fact that never before has the rule been so stated but
rather it is the result of cross-examining as to mere attempts, arrests and indictments, without conviction. These
raise independent issues and do not assert the fact, as a
conviction does.5 The court in the present case held inapplicable two cases which decided that "In a trial of a
prisoner for one crime, the Commonwealth cannot introduce evidence of his guilt of another independent crime."' ,
In these two cases the rule was laid down not because the
evidence was sought to be introduced in order to attack
credibility but rather, by these unconnected offenses, to
2

Gilchrist v. McKee, 4 Watts 380 (1835); Commonwealth v.
Payne, 205 Pa. 101 (1903); Commonwealth v. Williams, 209 Pa. 529
(1904); Weiss v. London G. & A. Co., 285 Pa. 251 (1926); Marshall v.
Carr, 271 Pa. 271 (1922).
2
ltalics by the author; Commonwealth v. Verano, 258 Pa. 42
(1917); Commonwealth v. Robzin, 78 Pa. Superior Ct. 292 (1922);
Commonwealth v. Arcurio, 92 Pa. Superior Ct. 404 (1927); Commonwealth v. Doe, 18 District 611 (1909); Commonwealth v. Barry, 8 Pa.
County Court 216 (1890); Commonwealth v. Shellenberger, 15 York
Legal Record 201; 2 Wigmore on Evidence, Secs. 977-989.
4Commonwealth v. Racco, (Supra); Commonwealth v. Payne,
(Supra); Commonwealth v. Dorst, 285 Pa. 232 (1926); Commonwealth
v. Dietrich, 65 Pa. Superior Ct. 599 (1916); Stout v. Rassel, 2 Yeates
334 (1796); Elliot v. Boyles, 31 Pa. 65 (1858).
5
Ramsey v. Johnson, 2 Pen. & Watts 293 (1831); Commonwealth
v. Verano, (Supra); Commonwealth v. Arcurio, (Supra); Commonwealth v. Keegan, 70 Pa. Superior Ct. 436 (1919); Stout v. Rassel,
(Supra); 2 Wigmore on Evidence, (Supra); Buck v. Commonwealth,
107 Pa. 486 (1884).
OCommonwealth v. Haines, 257 Pa. 289 (1917); Commonwealth v.
Gibson, 275 Pa. 338 (1922).
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prove the guilt of the defendant as to the crime for which
he was on trial.
The basis of this question is founded in historical reasons for disqualifying a witness. At the early common law
in England, the test set forth by Justice Kephart was used
to disqualify and not to attack credibility. The reasons are:
first, the structure of the social classes in England was to a
considerable degree founded upon freedom from the ignom-

iny of convictions for any such crime; secondly, the disqualification was regarded as a punishment; and thirdly,
these crimes were regarded as involving moral turpitude,
and hence, in no event, was the witness to be allowed to
testify.7 From these reasons, the rules as to admissibility
of such evidence to attack credibility was .founded.
The rule as set forth by the court is apparently the
majority view, according to Mr. Justice Kephart's opinion,
but from an analysis of Dean Wigmore's treatment of the
subject we find that this is not so and further, that this
rule is really a reversion to the early common law rule.
Wigmore queries, "What crimes are relevant to indicate
bad character as to credibility?" Answering he enumerates three classes. First, "Whatever offenges were formerly treated as disqualifying one as a witness shall now be
treated as available for impeachment. Second, if in a given
jurisdiction general bad character is allowable for impeachment, then any offense will serve to indicate such bad
character. Third, if character for veracity only is allowable for impeachment then only such specific offenses may
be used as indicate a lack of veracity character."8 He then
attempts to classify the American jurisdictions and says,
"In the United States however, only veracity character is
admitted in the great majority of jurisdictions", classifying
Pennsylvania as one of these jurisdictions. 9
The instant case, however, would seem to coitrovert
this classification for we see here the peculiar result of a
combination of rules one and three, resulting, in effect, in
rule two as to its operation. This singular result is based
upon the Court's own definition of the rule. The court
attempts to state a definite rule and then says the discretion
as to admissibility is vested in the trial judge. We submit that whenever there is a discretion granted, there is at
least a possibility of the abuse of such discretion especially
72

Wigmore on Evidence, Secs. 519 and 520.

82 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 980.

92 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 923 and cases cited.
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in "the cases of defendants of known criminal habit." The
court says, "Every offense is not relevant * * * the only
crimes admissible to attack veracity are such as affect credibility and refer to the conviction of a felony or a misdemeanor in the nature of crimeni falsi * * * in determining
such crimes * * * the discretion is in the trial judge". Furthermore, where the trial judge admits the record in his discretion, it has often been repeated by the Supreme Court
that the decision will not be reviewed except for an abuse
of such discretion.' 0 By submitting this criticism it is not
to be taken that we are overcome by a maudlin sympathy
for criminals, but rather we feel that our courts should at
least be consistent and state our rule to be as it really will
in effect operate, namely, "If in a given jurisdiction general
bad character is allowable for impeachment, then any offense will serve to indicate such bad character"."'
The present case and the early decisions can not be
reconciled except by accepting the above view, Some
earlier cases hold that "a witness may be interrogated as to
his conviction of such offenses as affect his credibility but it
is not the proper practice to ask him as to his guilt of some
other alleged crime not connected with the case on trial and
for which he has never been convicted". 12 Others state that
"credit of a witness can be impeached only by his general
character". 1 In most of the previous decisions the main
question is often blurred by attempts to question witnesses
as to previous arrests and indictments without producing
the record of conviction for such offenses. It is obvious
that such questions should not be permitted for it is entirely
possible for an innocent man to be arrested or indicted.
Most cases have refused to allow such questions,1 4 but
others state that this is also within the discretion of the
trial judge. 15 This much at least has been settled by the
I0Van Horn v. P. R. T., 295 Pa. 525 (1929).
112 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 980.
12Commonwealth v. Racco, (Supra); Commonwealth v. Varano,
(Supra); Commonwealth v. Arcurio, (Supra).
13Elliot v. Boyles, (Supra); Stout v. Rassel, (Supra); Ramsey
v. Johnson, (Supra); Hallihan v. Scranton Rwy. Co., 15 Pa. District

401 (1906).

"4Elliot v. Boyles, (Supra); Stout v. Rassel, (Supra); Gilchrist v.
McKee, (Supra); See cases under footnote 2.
"5Rhone v. Borland, 7 Atlantic Reporter 151 (Pa. 1886); Commonwealth v. Dorst, (Supra); Weiss v. London G. & A. Co., (Supra);
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decision in Commonwealth v. Quaranta,6 the record of the
conviction only is admissible.
On first glance the rule seems to be meritable on the
basis of simplicity. However, the real difficulty arises
in determining what crimes involve the element of crimen
falsi. The authorities all admit that the term and its elements are quite difficult of exact definition. It has been
defined as "Any crime which may injuriously affect the administration of justice, by the introduction of falsehood and
fraud. The meaning of this term at common law is not
well defined. It has been held to include forgery, perjury,
subornation of perjury, suppression of testimony by bribery, conspiracy to procure the absence of a witness, conspiracy to accuse of crime, barrotry. The effect of a conviction of a crime of this class is infamy and incompetence
to testify".17

Comparing this definition with the cases and

the records admitted to attack credibility we find larceny, 8

battery, 9 driving an automobile while intoxicated, 20 manslaughter, 2' adultery,2 2 burglary, 2 assault,2 4 stealing whis-

key,25 larceny by bailee and obtaining money under false
pretenses, 26 extortion 27

as crimes involving the veracity

of a witness. There probably are many others which
could be enumerated. This comparison, we believe, shows
the inconsistency of the new appellate ruling and to our
mind strengthens the argument that the second rule, set
forth above, should be the rule in this commonwealth.
There is perhaps some justification for allowing records
of previous convictions for crimes involving the elements of
crimen falsi (if they can be so determined) but admission
Commonwealth v. Goldberg, 18 Delaware County 42 (1927); Commonwealth v. Racco, (Supra).
16
Commonwealth v. Quaranto, (Supra).
17 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Baldwin's Edition, 1928; Commonwealth v. Ohio & Penn. R. R., 1 Grant's Cases 329 (1855); United
States v. Sims, 161 Federal Reporter 1008 (1907).
'"Commonwealth

v. Varano, (Supra).

19 Commonwealth v. Racco, (Supra).
2oCommonwealth v. Grill, 19 Berks County 555 (1927).
2

aCommonwealth v. Barry, (Supra).

22

Commonwealth
2sCommonwealth
24
Commonwealth
25Commonwealth
26Commonwealth
27Commonwealth

v. Arcurio, (Supra).
v. Doe, 79 Pa. Superior Ct. 162 (1922).
v. Lisowski, 274 Pa. 222 (1922).
v. Pezzner, 78 Pa. Superior Ct. 286 (1922).
v. Vis, 81 Pa. Superior Ct. 384 (1923).
v. Valenti, 19 Delaware County 221 (1928).
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of such records as to prior felonies, can have no logical
bearing upon whether the witness in the present instance
is telling the truth. The Quaranta case itseif does not
disclose the fact, but from the record we learn that the
defendant was some time previously convicted of highway
robbery. We must bear in mind that the purpose for which
these records are to be admitted is solely to discredit the
witness, in other words, to attack his veracity. "Veracity
is the quality or state of being veracious, or true; habitual
observance of the truth".28 Credibility is "Worthiness of
belief".2 9 Observing this, we query, is it not possible for
a man to be a felon and yet have a scrupulous regard for
the truth? Very often, force of circumstances may compel
a man to rob, to steal and so on; but to perjure, to obstruct
justice really does involve the element of a deliberate intent to lie or to forestall the truth. Unquestionably, the
introduction of evidence of a felony, merely because it is
a felony, does injure the defendant. In practical effect he
is thus forced to combat not only the crime for which he
is being tried but the undeterminable injury resulting from
bringing in the record of the unconnected crime, under the
guise of attacking credibility.
It appears to us that the better method of attacking
veracity is by bringing in witnesses as to his reputation for
veracity. A man may have been convicted of the crime of
manslaughter and yet be regarded by his neighbors and
community as truthful despite his previous offense. On the
other hand, if he has not been convicted of any such felony,
his reputation for veracity may still be attacked by the
same evidence of reputation. In other words, we believe
that the criterion for veracity is not his previous conviction but what his reputation for veracity is among the
members of his community. In lieu of such test, then the
only fair test is for our legislature to enumerate the offenses, conviction of which may be shown to attack a witness' veracity character. Even though a witness may be of
"known criminal repute" he is still under our laws entitled
to a fair trial.
Arthur Markowitz
2fWebster's Dictionary.
29Bouvier's Dictionary (Supra).

